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ABSTRACT 
The notion of wealth appears and reappears in Ricardo’s works within three different sets of 
arguments. One is concerned with the distinction between wealth and value, another with the causes 
of the progress of wealth, the third with the consequences of this progress on the trend of natural 
wages, profit and rent. Ricardo deals with these subjects sometimes in agreement and sometimes in 
disagreement with Smith. The agreement reaches a climax on the notion of wealth as such as well 
as on the causes of its progress while the disagreement ramifies into the foundations both of that 
distinction and of the resulting conclusions on the trend of natural wages, profits and rent. This 
entry will focus on the details of Ricardo’s agreements and disagreements with Smith on the subject 
of wealth as distinct from the close subject of value. We will prove that, except for some minor 
differences, Ricardo’s notion of wealth is the same as Smith’s. As such, it is used by Ricardo as 
synonymous with the notion of the “annual produce of the land and labour”, or of the “necessaries, 
conveniences and amusements of human life”, available in a country in a period. This coincidence 
permeates Ricardo’s theory of wealth in so far as this theory is focused on the progress, as distinct 
from the distribution, of wealth. Thus, starting from a similar theory of wealth but from a very 
different theory of value, Ricardo develops some of his criticisms of Adam Smith’s theory on the 
basis of his distinction between value and riches (wealth) as well as of his exclusive notion of rent 
as a price paid to the owner of land “for the use of its original and indestructible powers”. These 
criticisms are consistent with Ricardo’s starting point on value as labour embodied and are in 
contrast with Smith’s different starting point on value as labour commanded. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 A draft of this paper has been submittted for publication in the Elgar Companion to David 
Ricardo, edited by H. Kurz and N. Salvadori, E. Elgar, forthcoming 
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The notion of wealth appears and reappears in Ricardo’s works within three different sets of 
arguments. One is concerned with the distinction between wealth and value, another with the causes 
of the progress of wealth, the third with the consequences of this progress on the trend of natural 
wages, profit and rent. Ricardo deals with these subjects sometimes in agreement and sometimes in 
disagreement with Smith. The agreement reaches a climax on the notion of wealth as such as well 
as on the causes of its progress while the disagreement ramifies into the foundations both of that 
distinction and of the resulting conclusions on the trend of natural wages, profits and rent.  
 
1. Ricardo’s notion of wealth  
Ricardo’s notion of wealth coincides with Smith’s in the general sense that both of them reject 
the popular idea that wealth consists in money (gold or silver) along with the associated idea that 
one nation’s gain must be another nation’s loss (WN IV.i; Works III: 139-45; on the notion of 
wealth in classical economics, see Meacci 1998a). It also coincides with that notion, except for 
some details to be discussed below, in the more specific sense of regarding wealth as the “annual 
produce of the land and labour” or, more precisely, as the annual flow of the “necessaries, 
conveniences and amusements of human life” available in a country in a period. These similarities 
do not rule out some different meanings in that wealth is intended by both authors sometimes as a 
flow in a period of time and sometimes as a stock at an instant of time, and in both cases either as a 
flow or stock sometimes of final goods and sometimes of final + instrumental goods. Thus while 
Smith uses the term wealth as synonymous mostly with revenue (a flow) and sometimes with a 
stock of goods (though never of money), Ricardo uses the same term as synonymous sometimes 
with riches, sometimes with (the aggregate of) use values, and sometimes with (net and gross) 
revenue, (net and gross) income and (net and gross) produce (see, for instance, Ch. XXVI and Ch. 
XXXI). Now while the terms “wealth”, “riches” and “use values” are different words that may be 
properly used for the same concept, the terms “revenue”, “income” and “produce” convey different 
concepts depending on whether they are considered from the standpoint either of an individual or of 
the whole society. When, for instance, it comes to the latter standpoint, the term revenue (which -as 
noted by Marx, Capital, Vol.2, Ch.19- comes from the French verb revenir) rather conveys the idea 
of final goods that return to life in the current year as a result of the wage goods exchanged for, and 
consumed by, the labour employed in the process of their reproduction, while the terms “income” 
and “produce” rather cpnvey the different concepts of goods that either “come in” or are 
“produced” in the current year regardless of the labour employed, respectively, in the current or in 
previous years. 
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2. Material vs. immaterial objects 
However close to Smith’s notion of wealth as the “annual produce of the land and labour of a 
country” and as the “necessaries, conveniences and amusements of human life” available in a given 
period, Ricardo’s notion is incidentally different if one looks at his treatment of this issue in his 
Notes on Malthus’s Principles of Political Economy (Works, II). For in the third of these notes he 
shares Malthus’ attempt to fill the gap left over by Smith by drawing a line between “material” and 
“immaterial” objects and by confining the notion of wealth only to “those material objects which 
are necessary, useful, or agreeable to mankind”. This definition, it must be noted, excludes all the 
services that, though “necessary, useful, or agreeable to mankind”, account for an increasing part of 
the wealth of a country as this increases from period to period. Moreover, the justification provided 
by Malthus/Ricardo that only material objects are “capable of accumulation and definite valuation” 
denies the existence, stressed by Smith in the first place and shared ever since, of those forms of 
human capital that are in their turn “capable of accumulation”. On the other hand, Malthus’s further 
objection, implicitly shared by Ricardo, that Smith’s notion of wealth as the “annual produce of 
land and labour” is “not sufficiently discriminate, as it would include all the useless products of the 
earth, as well as those which are appropriated and enjoyed by man”, would be acceptable only if 
Smith had written “annual produce of land or labour”. However, this never occurs in his work 
except in a single passage, misquoted by Ricardo as the “annual produce either of land and labour” 
(Principles Ch. XXII, 308) where Smith speaks of the produce “either of land or labour” (WN 
IV.v.14; italics added). While Ricardo’s use of the term “and” in the passage just quoted may be 
viewed as a misprint, Smith’s replacement of the term “or” for the term “and” used throughout the 
Wealth does not seem to be a misprint if only because Smith is here speaking not of the production 
and reproduction of national wealth but only of the money price of whatever is produced in relation 
to a change in the money price of labour. Yet, in spite of his minor  misinterpretation of Smith’s 
famous expression, Ricardo was fairly equipped to enrich rather than, in Malthus’s footsteps, to 
impoverish the notion of national wealth conveyed -and the theory of reproduction introduced- by 
that expression. For, given the distinction highlighted in Section III, Chapter I, of his Principles, 
Ricardo could have re-launched that notion in the more exact sense of the annual produce of land 
and labour, whether direct or indirect, rather than in the weaker sense that he seems to share while 
endorsing Malthus’s misleading attempt to criticize Smith’s notion of wealth as including “all the 
useless products of the earth”. In any case and contrary to this endorsement of Malthus’s view, the 
direct/indirect labour qualification is required in Ricardo’s system of thought at least when he 
comes to the exchangeable value of the annual produce as determined by the total labour embodied 
in it. Such a qualification is therefore consistent with a notion of wealth which includes, as it does in 
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Smith’s system of thought, all the products “which are appropriated and enjoyed by man” in so far 
as these products, be they material or immaterial objects, are the exclusive result of the employment 
of labour. 
 
3. National wealth vs. individual wealth 
The common origin of Smith’s and Ricardo’s notion of wealth is made clear when, right at the 
beginning of his criticisms of Mercantilism, Smith objects to the popular prejudice that “a rich 
country, in the same manner as a rich man, is supposed to be a country abounding in money“ (WN 
IV.i.2). This sentence reveals that the identification of wealth with money (gold and silver) is in 
turn the result of the more general confusion between the nature and progress of the wealth of an 
individual (“a rich man”) and the nature and progress of the wealth of a nation (“a rich country”). 
The former kind of wealth is best illustrated by J. S. Mill -and is best distinguished from the other- 
when he writes that “to an individual anything is wealth which, though useless in itself, enables him 
to claim from others a part of their stock of things useful or pleasant” (1965, 8). Ricardo’s neglect 
for whatever may be part of the wealth of an individual without being part of the “annual produce of 
the land and labour of a country” is justified, however, by Smith’s own statement, silently shared by 
Ricardo, that “the general stock of any country or society is the same with that of all its inhabitants 
or members, and therefore naturally divides itself into the same three portions, each of which has a 
distinct function or office” (WN II.i.11). This statement, which is concerned with the capital stock 
of a nation as part of its wealth considered at an instant of time, is an assumption which is 
introduced to simplify -rather than to confuse- the relation between the wealth of an individual and 
the wealth of society. This assumption proves that Ricardo’s method of analysis is, at least in this 
connection, the same as Smith’s in so far as both authors look at the progress and distribution of the 
wealth of nations as two distinct outcomes of the interactions between their different inhabitants. 
Hence the idea that the component parts of the “annual produce” of a country cannot be but the 
property of its individual members along with the idea, partly and incidentally rejected by Ricardo 
as argued above, that all these parts cannot be but products of their own labour. Hence the 
importance of keeping apart, while studying together, the concept and theory of exchangeable value 
(i.e. of what is owned by an individual in terms of what is owned by another) from the concept and 
theory of national wealth (i.e. of the flow of the use values annually produced by labour regardless 
of who owns what). 
 
4. Wealth vs. value 
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The distinction and connection between the wealth of an individual (which consists of 
exchangeable values and is based on the concept of property) and the wealth of society (which 
consists of use values and is unconnected to that concept) comes to the fore in Ch. XX, Value and 
Riches, their Distinctive Properties, of Ricardo’s Principles (for further details on this issue, see 
Meacci 1998b, 2012). Smith’s statement on whether “a man is rich or poor” is here mentioned by 
Ricardo along with  his arguments on whether “a country is rich or poor” in a manner that reminds 
of Smith’s initial criticisms of Mercantilism although the whole chapter is intended as a critique of 
Smith’s fundamental theory of value. Here Ricardo lays bare Smith’s ambiguity whereby a man is 
said to be rich or poor depending on the amount of necessaries, conveniences and amusements that 
“he can afford to enjoy” as well as that “he can afford to purchase” (WN I.v.1, italics added) as if 
these were two equivalent expressions in spite of the cardinal distinction between value in use and 
value in exchange. Ricardo then focuses on the resulting confusions by which other authors, such as 
Lauderdale (1962 [1804] and Say 1821 [1803-1819]), deal with this issue in spite of their criticisms 
of Smith’s treatment of the same topic. While Ricardo’s criticism of Say is focused on the latter’s 
alleged confusion between value in use and value in exchange, his criticism of Lauderdale is based 
on the equivalent confusion between the wealth of an individual and the wealth of society. After 
reconstructing Lauderdale’s argument that, if water becomes scarce and is exclusively possessed by 
an individual, “you will increase his riches, because water will then have value; and if wealth be the 
aggregate of individual riches, you will by the same means also increase wealth”, Ricardo rejects 
this argument by distinguishing not only between the case of water becoming the object of 
monopoly and the case of water becoming scarce, but also between the resulting increase in the 
wealth of an individual as distinct from the wealth of society: 
“You undoubtedly will increase the riches of this individual, but inasmuch as the farmer must sell a 
part of his corn, the shoemaker a part of his shoes, and all men give up a portion of their possessions 
for the sole purpose of supplying themselves with water, which they before had for nothing, they 
are poorer by the whole quantity of commodities which they are obliged to devote to this purpose, 
and the proprietor of water is benefited precisely by the amount of their loss. The same quantity of 
water, and the same quantity of commodities, are enjoyed by the whole society, but they are 
differently distributed” (Principles XX, 276).  
In an attempt to strengthen his strictures against Lauderdale’s confusion, Ricardo proceeds 
by arguing that the wealth of a country may increase, unlike the wealth of an individual, only in two 
ways; i.e. either 1) “by employing a greater portion of revenue in the maintenance of productive 
labour,—which will not only add to the quantity, but to the value of the mass of commodities”; or 
2) “without employing any additional quantity of labour, by making the same quantity more 
productive,—which will add to the abundance, but not to the value of commodities” (Principles 
XX, 278-9). These arguments reveal some important similarities and differences between Ricardo 
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and Smith. For, Ricardo’s conclusion that in the first case “a country would not only become rich, 
but the value of its riches would increase” while in the second case “wealth would increase, but not 
value” is the same as Smith’s with regard to riches (the wealth of nations) but is utterly different 
with regard to value (the exchangeable value of one commodity in terms of another). Hence the 
different meanings of the term value and the different variations of its magnitude in the two cases: 
while the value figured out by Ricardo (as increasing in the first case and remaining unchanged in 
the latter) is determined by the labour embodied in the “necessaries, conveniences and amusements 
of human life” that make up the revenue or wealth of a country, Smith would intend the first part, 
and would restructure the second part, of Ricardo’s sentence above in the sense that not only the 
quantity but also the value of riches (wealth) would increase in both cases. But while, according to 
Smith, this quantity would increase for the same reason as Ricardo’s, its value would increase in the 
different sense that the resulting  amount of riches (wealth) would be able to command an 
increasing amount of labour at a given wage rate (or a constant amount of labour at an increasing 
wage rate). Hence the more general similarities between Smith and Ricardo as one moves from their 
common views of wealth to their theory of capital as the main engine for its increase. Thus, in the 
very chapter on value and riches where he discusses the “two ways” in which the wealth of a 
country may increase, Ricardo speaks of capital as “that part of the wealth of a country which is 
employed with a view to future production, and may be increased in the same manner as wealth”; 
i.e. again in two ways depending on whether, to use a subsequent terminology, the forms of 
accumulation are those of “capital widening” or “capital deepening”. Likewise, when in his chapter 
On Wages he comes to the distinction between the market and natural price of labour as well as to 
their variations in connection with the accumulation of capital, Ricardo still defines capital as “that 
part of the wealth of a country which is employed in production, and consists of food, clothing, 
tools, raw materials, machinery, &c. necessary to give effect to labour” (Principles, 95). Here 
capital is regarded in the same sense as wealth, i.e. not only as the capital or wealth of a country but 
also as a stock or a flow, depending on whether capital and wealth are considered at an instant of 
time (as it happens in the sentence just quoted) or in a period or sequence of periods (when capital 
and wealth equally appear as two flows of which one corresponds to the “funds destined to the 
maintenance of productive labour” while the other corresponds to the “necessaries, conveniences 
and amusements of human life” available in a given period). 
 
 
5. Wealth vs. value and rent 
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The notions of wealth and value reappear in Ricardo’s chapter On Rent. Here, however, he fails 
to reutilize properly these notions while criticizing the priority assigned by Smith (and others, as he 
says) to agriculture in the reproduction of national wealth (WN II.v). For, however coherent with the 
principles of value and rent established in the two initial chapters of his Principles, Ricardo’s 
criticisms are here incompatible with the spirit of Book II of the Wealth and in particular with its 
chapter V. For Smith uses the same term rent with two different meanings depending on whether it 
comes to the theory of value and distribution developed in Book I (where rent is defined as the 
“price paid for the use of land”) or to the theory of capital and reproduction developed in Book II 
(where rent is defined as the “produce of those powers of nature, the use of which the landlord 
lends to the farmer”). These different meanings were highlighted by Senior in the sense that the 
former refers to what “occasions rent to be demanded” (so that rent in this sense is an “evil”) while 
“it is the other which enables it to be paid” (so that rent in this sense is a “good”) (1965, 138 
[1836]). Thus, while Ricardo seems to regard rent as an unavoidable “evil” (hence his view of the 
interests of landlords as “always opposed” to those of society), Smith seems to regard it as an “evil” 
in Book I and as a “good” in Book II (hence his view of those interests as “strictly and inseparably” 
linked with those of society). Now Ricardo gets rid of this seeming contradiction by suppressing 
one of the two terms on which this ambiguity is based. This is the notion of rent as a “good”, i.e. as 
a net product. But, however consistent Ricardo’s theory of rent may be with his own theory of 
value, his interpretation of Smith’s ambiguous treatment of the same subject is flawed by his own 
inability to disentangle the notion of rent as the price that someone pays to someone else for the use 
of the land as the latter’s property (a subject that belongs to the theory of the exchangeable value of 
commodities) from the notion of rent as the net product that comes to light when the harvest is 
compared with the advances required to obtain it regardless of who owns the land (a subject that 
belongs to the theory of wealth as a flow of use values). It is true, as Ricardo writes at the end of his 
final chapter on Malthus’s opinions on rent, that “one set of necessaries and conveniences admits of 
no comparison with another set; value in use cannot be measured by any known standard; it is 
differently estimated by different persons” (Principles, 429). But here again Ricardo seems to be 
considering Smith’s theory with the eyes of an author whose starting points are very different from 
those of the author he is criticizing. For the notion of rent as a net product can be accommodated in 
Smith’s system of thought in spite of the heterogeneity of the commodities that mark the beginning 
and end of their reproduction periods. For the difference between the two flows of use values 
involved in the “reproduction of rent” can be overcome if one applies to it the notion of value 
adopted by Smith and rejected by Ricardo at the very beginning of their systems of thought. This is 
the notion of value as labour commanded. According to this notion, that difference represents, 
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whatever the heterogeneity of the goods going into and out of the process of reproduction, the 
power to command, directly or indirectly and inside or outside agriculture, a quantity of labour 
greater than the quantity spent to obtain this power. It is this, not the other, kind of rent that is in 
Malthus’s mind when he regards rent as a cause of the otherwise impossible origin of cities, armies 
and fleets, arts, learning, etc. (1986, I.3.i [1836]). 
 
6. A summing up 
Except for some minor differences, Ricardo’s notion of wealth is the same as Smith’s. As such, 
it is used by Ricardo as synonymous with the notion of the “annual produce of the land and labour”, 
or of the “necessaries, conveniences and amusements of human life”, available in a country in a 
period. This coincidence permeates Ricardo’s theory of wealth in so far as this theory is focused on 
the progress, as distinct from the distribution, of wealth. Thus, starting from a similar theory of 
wealth but from a very different theory of value, Ricardo develops some of his criticisms of Adam 
Smith’s theory on the basis of his distinction between value and riches (wealth) as well as of his 
exclusive notion of rent as a price paid to the owner of land “for the use of its original and 
indestructible powers”. These criticisms are consistent with Ricardo’s starting point on value as 
labour embodied and are in contrast with Smith’s different starting point on value as labour 
commanded. 
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